RedBlueThoughts

O, you, soldiers of the Filipino People! Read the article below of my colleague Ellen Tordesillas. It tells about the circumstances behind the massacre of Marines in Basilan last July 10.

Net of discussion, many Marines died because General Dolorfino and a civilian idiot reined their hands in calling for air support. If this article is true, many Marines died because government nincompoops tried to protect their ASG asset, Jamiri. This Jamiri character is obviously, a military asset.

Obviously, this Bossi episode is a government-instigated incident. Imagine, a close associate of the palace used the ASG to conduct another kidnapping. For what? To create instability in Mindanao. For what again? Instability in Mindanao justifies a palace coup.

A palace coup will protect the hides of GMA and her minions. A self-coup will enable GMA and her corrupt gang to still plunder the public coffers even after 2010. Obviously, these rumours of a coup are being fanned by the palace itself to create instability. Instability, obviously, adds more power to GMA. More instability, more power.

I take back what I wrote in an earlier blog. What is happening is not a Magdalo nor an Erap action. The state is subverting itself to gain more power. It is sacrificing more soldiers to be able to stay in power even after 2010.

This coup is God Save the Queen part two.

If this succeeds, it proves two things: First, there is no more opposition. Second, the Magdalo is just a mirage. Third, there is no hope left for the people. And fourth, we will have to brace ourselves for a long rule of GMA and the FVR clique until 2020.

The dark night will continue. And nobody can stop the Queen’s Knights from protecting their benefactor.

Will the soldiers of the Filipino People do something about this? I doubt it. Marami nang me daga sa dibdib sa ating kasundaluhan. Mga duwag na mayabang lang sa propaganda, walang gawa.

Making sense of the Basilan debacle
PASSING THROUGH
By ELLEN TORDESILLAS

AS the military gears for the major offensive that AFP chief of staff Gen. Hermogenes Esperon Jr. announced in Basilan last week, the people recoil over how many lives will be lost further in a war that they do not understand.

The double agent

AS the military gears for the major offensive that AFP chief of staff Gen. Hermogenes Esperon Jr. announced in Basilan last week, the people recoil over how many lives will be lost further in a war that they do not understand.

In less than two months, the hostilities, which started with the July 10 ambush by elements of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front in the town of Al-Barka (formerly Tipo-Tipo) in Basilan, have claimed more than a hundred lives. Fifty-seven soldiers have died, 10 of them in a most gruesome manner, and 30,000 persons have been displaced.

An undetermined number have been killed on the side of the “enemy” that the public is not so clear about.

In our effort to make sense of confusing reports on the current Basilan and Sulu hostilities, we discovered more disturbing revelations and connections to as far back as the tragic Lamitan siege six years ago, where military connivance with the dreaded Abu Sayyaf group was exposed.

So far, these are what we have found out:

The 1st Marine Brigade commanded by Col. Ramiro Alivio was passing by Guinanta village, an MILF enclave, in Al-Barka early morning of June 10, 2007 after a fruitless search for kidnapped Italian priest Giancarlo Bossi.

Doubts have been raised on the Bossi angle because there were other reports that the kidnapped priest was spotted in Lanao del Norte which turned out to be true because he surfaced there nine days after.

But Alivio insists their “intel tracking for two weeks point to Bossi in Basilan.”

What gave Alivio’s intelligence agents the idea that Bossi was in Basilan was Buhari Jamiri, one of Bossi’s kidnappers. In Fr. Bossi’s testimony before anti-terrorist magistrates in Rome, he said that he was kidnapped by about 10 men who described themselves as members of the Abu Sayyaf group.

Jamiri was spotted in Al-Barka and the 1st Marine Brigade probably thought he had Bossi with him. A source said that what the Marines didn’t take into consideration was that the ASG kidnappers were taking turns in keeping watch over their victim.

Jamiri is also identified as part of the MILF Lost Command. But what probably the Marines didn’t know was Jamiri was a Philippine Army asset.

The source said when the Marines’ intel assets saw Jamiri enter Guinanta, they sent the message, “Positive, pumasok. Padala ng tropa.” (Positive. He entered. Send in the troops.) That was how the July 10 operation came about.

Not surprisingly, the Marines didn’t find Bossi. But what surprised them on their way back was the sight of Jamiri, fully-armed, among the MILF ambushers. A source said that shortly before the Marines came, Jamiri was seen going around in a motorcycle in what was apparently a reconnaissance assignment for the MILF.

Did Jamiri know of the Marine operation through his Army connections? That’s one of the things that military investigators are trying to find out.

Jamiri was identified by Rep. Wahab Akbar as one of those who beheaded the 10 Marines. The information of Akbar, who is suspected to be coddling the Abu Sayyaf, is viewed by investigators with suspicion as his way of eliminating rivals.

Last Aug. 9, Jamiri surrendered to GMA-7 reporter Jiggy Manicad in Barangay Lagayas, Al-Barka. Manicad turned over the ASG/MILF/Army asset to the NBI, which in turn accompanied him to the Intelligence Service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.

Jamiri, who is now under the custody of the NBI, Manila, has offered to be a state witness. He admitted he was with MILF forces in the firefight but denied any part in the beheading and mutilation of 10 Marines.

A source said Jamiri’s Manila trip was actually to protect him from the wrath of the Marines.

Jamiri’s brother, Hajarun, a former town mayor in Basilan, was reportedly also part of the group that kidnapped Bossi. Interestingly, Hajarun was reported in another newspaper as the one who was tasked by Malacañang to negotiate for the release of Bossi and to make sure that it was done before Gloria Arroyo’s State of the Nation Address on July 23.

Gonzalez and Dolorfino direct behind the scene

At the height of the firefight between the soldiers of the 1st Marine Brigade and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front in the village of Guinanta in Al-Barka, Basilan, Gloria Arroyo was at the Pryce Hotel in Cagayan de Oro City talking about “Muslim brothers and sisters working in good faith with our government” and being “on the cusp of a permanent peace” in Mindanao.

She was addressing the Mindanao Peace and Security Summit. With her were national security adviser Norberto Gonzales, at that time acting defense secretary; Lt. Gen. Eugenio Cedo, head of the Western Mindanao Command; and Maj. Gen. Ben Dolorfino, commander of the National Capital Region Command and co-chair of the government Ad Hoc Joint Action Group negotiating with the MILF. Dolofino is also the incoming commander of the Philippine Marines.

A Malacañang source said that when Cedo got the information about the ongoing hostilities in Guinanta, he informed Gonzales who asked Dolorfino if he had gotten any feedback from the MILF. “May umaangal na ba?” (Is anybody complaining yet?) Gonzales allegedly asked.

Dolorfino said the MILF considered it a violation of the cease-fire agreement and warned of a backlash. Gonzales, the source said, remarked “we must control the situation.”

The Palace source was not sure if Gonzales’ “we must control the situation” was an order and how Dolorfino took it.

A military source gave us their version of “control the situation”: Somebody informed Gonzales and Dolorfino of the ongoing incident. Gonzales told Dolorfino to control the situation.

“General Dolorfino called up General Sabban (acting WestMinCom commander) to halt the offensive but the latter denied the pleadings. Sabban is a Marine. Thus General Dolorfino called up directly the CASAF (Composite Air Support) to abort the air support, by-passing the WestMinCom.”

Dolorfino reportedly said he was doing it as co-chairman of AHJAG, a body working in coordination with Committee on the Cessation of hostilities (CCCH) to apprehend criminal elements in so-called “MILF areas/communities.”

“The choppers were ordered to return to their base by their commander,” the source said.

Another military source said in the After Battle Reports of the officers involved in the July 10 operation, it was shown that “only 6 rounds of 105 HW rounds were fired.” When a ranking Marine official inquired why, he was told “it was the cease-fire committee who ordered not to fire because they were engaging friendly forces.”

Another source said an artillery commander said he got an order from Dolorfino to “cease firing.”

Dolorfino denies that he called anybody to stop fighting. “Wala ako doon. Wala akong tinawagan.” (I was not there. I didn’t call anybody.)

Dolorfino denied recalling the aircraft. He said his statement can be checked with Sabban.

Told about the information that he was doing it as co-chair of AHJAG, he said that body has been de-activated. But a day after the Basilan debacle, Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita was still referring to AHJAG as an active body. Ermita said: “The government will bring the incident to the attention of the Ad-Hoc Joint Action Group of the GRP and MILF panels, the CCCH and the Malaysian-dominated International Monitoring Group.”

Relieved 1st Marine Brigade commander Col. Ramiro Alivio, who stated in his ABR that “for unknown reasons the aircraft” was recalled, supports Dolorfino’s denial. Asked if it was Dolorfino who recalled the aircraft, Alivio said, “Not Dolorfino as he was not in the WesMinCom chain of command.”

Lack of aerial support was one of the reasons given for the big number of casualties by the Marines – fourteen, ten of them beheaded.

The Air Force sent four aircraft. The Huey helicopter had to turn back immediately after it was hit by enemy fire. The OV-10 Bronco bomber and two MG-530 gunships circled the area for about two hours but withdrew without firing a shot. The Bronco bomber had to drop its bomb at sea for safety reasons.

Another version about the lack of aerial support for the beleaguered Marines was that of the radioman who executed an affidavit that the ground forces did not have contact with the aircraft “because the 1MBde gave the wrong frequency to WestMinCom which was later transmitted to the pilots.”

A source privy to the investigation conducted by the military said: “For several hours the troops were not able to establish radio contact with the aircraft hence he (pilot) could not determine the location of the enemy as well as the friendly forces. The pilot on his own discretion cancelled the mission since for several hours (2 to 3 hours) there was no contact on the ground and they were running out of fuel.”

Col. Alivio’s explanation on why only six rounds of 105 mm howitzers were fired belies meddling by the cease-fire committee. He said “Lt. Col. Almadrones did not get a positive observation for the calls for fire.” A military officer said that means the information given by troop’s forward observers, who were near the target, showed their firings were not hitting the targets.

Brig. Gen. Edgardo Gurrea, chief of the government’s Coordinating Committee on the Cessation of Hostilities, however, told another story in an interview with ANC’s Pia Hontiveros yesterday. Gurrea said Dolorfino talked with Alivio.

Gurrea also said Dolorfino talked with Maj. Minandang Macatoon, one of Alivio’s men to “de-escalate the tension.”

The conflicting versions of the July 10 fiasco give credence to detained Sen. Antonio Trillanes’ “inside information” that some officials of the government “had a direct hand in feeding our own military to the enemies of the State that led to the tragic death of the fourteen members of the Philippine Marine Corps.”

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